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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
SIXTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS 
UNITED STATES CURRENCY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 950284-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This case begins with the routine traffic stop of a westbound 
vehicle travelling interstate through Grand County, Utah, and ends 
with sixteen thousand dollars being forfeited to the state. The 
record is deficient when viewed in terms of due process. The 
record is void of any link between the forfeiture of the currency 
and the corresponding, requisite violation of Utah law. 
POINT ONE: UTAH LAW DOES NOT PRECLUDE A FACTUAL APPEAL FROM A 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE A 60(b) 
MOTION. 
The Notice of Appeal of this matter had to be filed prior to 
the date on which the hearing on the 60(b) Motion to Set Aside was 
set. Therefore the decision to deny the Appellant's Motion to Set 
Aside was made by the district court after the Notice was filed 
herein. Thus, the first issue of the Brief of Appellant is styled 
as an issue of the review of the trial court's findings for 
correctness. 
Unaware of the procedural chain of events, Appellee argues 
that Appellant must appeal the 60(b) motion. Appellee concedes 
that the relief sought by appellant may be granted. Appellee 
states, "no Utah precedent has decided the precise issue of a 
factual appeal from default which did not include the 60(b) motion, 
[but] some jurisdictions disfavor any direct appeal from default 
judgments." Appellee's Brief at 7. Appellee cites to dubious 
authority (1970's cases from Arizona and Oregon) as his support for 
this pronouncement. 
Appellant maintains that the decision to be made by this Court 
is governed by the 1992 case of In re One Hundred Two Thousand 
Dollars in U.S. Currency, 823 P.2d 468 (Utah). The One Hundred Two 
Thousand Dollars case is on all fours with the case to be decided 
by this Court. The trial court in the case sub judice made no 
findings with regard to § 58-37-13(1)(g)—perhaps because none 
could be made. Appellant is willing to assume arguendo that the 
currency discovered by Trooper Mecam was generated in a drug 
transaction. Never, however, was any evidence submitted that the 
transaction took place in Utah. This Court is bound by the 
precedent of One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in which the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, "Jt is not enough that the currency may have 
been generated in a drug transaction which took place outside of 
Utah." Id. at 470 (emphasis added). The finding of the Utah 
Supreme Court in that case could be repeated verbatim by this Court 
in this case (with the exception that the automobile involved 
herein is a Hyundai, not a van: 
2 
It is only when the Utah act is violated that drug proceeds 
are subject to forfeiture under Section 58-37-13(1). Here, no 
attempt was made by the State to prove that the money came 
from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction in this 
state. No controlled substances were found in the van or on 
the person of any of the occupants. No criminal charges were 
filed against any of them. The van was merely passing through 
Utah on an interstate highway. 
Id. 
The district court herein plainly erred when it granted the 
state's petition for forfeiture of the currency. This Court owes 
the district court no particular deference and should review the 
district court's findings, summary as they may be, for correctness 
only. Such a review will reveal that the district court has erred 
in this instance. 
POINT TWO: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN MAKING 
INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT. 
Like the trial court, Appellee is either unaware of Utah law 
governing forfeiture, or chooses to ignore it. Appellee's argument 
that the "unrefuted evidence" that the $16,000 "was found in close 
proximity to a substance which field tested positive a [sic] 
marijuana" is of limited relevance in light of One Hundred Two 
Thousand Dollars.* Appellee7s argument is irrelevant in light of 
the fact that no finding was made that the $16,000 was the proceeds 
from a transaction which took place within the state of Utah. 
The clear mandate of One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars is that 
a connection must be made between the derivation of the currency 
and the State of Utah. No such connection was made in this case, 
even though the hearing took place by default and no opportunity to 
present contradictory evidence was given. As it happens, no 
contradictory evidence is required because no evidence of the 
connection was ever presented. 
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Appellee cites Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-13(1)(g)(ii) which 
states: "there is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, 
and currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled 
substances . . . are forfeitable under this section; the burden of 
proof is upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption." 
(Emphasis added.) However, Appellee neglects to read subpart(ii) 
in conjunction with subparagraph (g) which states that forfeitable 
items are considered such because they are "furnished or intended 
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled substance in violation 
of this chapter"; they are "proceeds traceable to any violation of 
this chapter"; or they are moneys "intended to be used to 
facilitate any violation of this chapter." No violation of 
Chapter 58 has ever been proven or even asserted. The 
uncontroverted testimony of Trooper Mecam is that Isidro Garcia was 
travelling from Chicago back to his home in California. Transcript 
at 6 (see Appendix). 
It is not enough that the currency may have been 
generated in a drug transaction which took place outside of 
Utah. It is only when the Utah act is violated that drug 
proceeds are subject to forfeiture under Section 58-37-13(1). 
Here, no attempt was made by the State to prove that the money 
came from or was intended to be used in a drug transaction in 
this state. No controlled substances were found in the van or 
on the person of any of the occupants. No criminal charges 
were filed against any of them. The van was merely passing 
through Utah on an interstate highway. 
In re One Hundred Two Thousand Dollars in U.S. Currency, 823 P.2d 
470 (emphasis added). 
There was no evidence offered in the trial court that the Utah 
act was violated. The Hyundai was merely passing through Utah on 
an interstate highway. The subject $16,000 should not have been 
subject to forfeiture. 
4 
POINT THREE: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A 
CONTINUANCE. 
Appellee states that the standard herein is one of abuse of 
discretion. Assuming that it is, Appellant maintains that the 
trial court did abuse its discretion in not granting a continuance 
in this matter where none had been previously granted the party 
requesting it. 
Appellant was not present or represented in the hearing in 
this regard. The matter had only been continued once previously, 
and that was at the request of the Grand County Attorney. Two days 
prior to the hearing, Isidro Garcia's attorney in California 
requested a continuance for the purpose of being admitted pro hac 
vice or obtaining local counsel. This request was denied and the 
default hearing was held in this matter. 
Appellee cites the case of Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375 (Utah 1988) for the proposition that "[t]he proper standard in 
reviewing a trial court's decision regarding continuance is an 
abuse of discretion standard." Appellee's Brief at 9. In the 
Christenson opinion, Justice Stewart found that it was not an abuse 
of discretion not to continue a trial based on the Plaintiff's 
complaint that they were unaware of the testimony of Defendant's 
expert until one day prior to the trial. Plaintiff therein argued 
that they could not properly prepare. The Court found that 
Plaintiff had had the opportunity to interview and depose the 
expert and therefor would not be allowed to complain that it was 
taken by surprise. This case is clearly dissimilar from the case 
at bar herein. 
Justices Hall/ Howe and Durham concurred in the Christenson 
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opinion. .^c Zimmermp*? writing separately, concurred in the 
resu] t, but nc -K: opinion. Justice 7 j mmerman examined the issue 
under the ^ ^  
Lihown I 11nil .-: oriox ^ommiLLciu u> i »J*J M J I. couri ^nreat 
refusing qra\: . itmuanc ^s n^ *- been sb' -
have-
believe that 4 * extui *as narmfuj ti ii/«. 
Certainly i * -is beer shown herein *•** * ^ ° erro? ^mit*^ bw 
the case sub juu±ce has sufficiently un :eri.* med the outcome to , * -».<: 
larmful error. Isid^o r.^ r^ i? i*-'-*< ^ f ^wed *"*<= d» 
has stated, "Ctsrtainiy, thi^ court should r .* r. reverse the rulanq of 
r trial * ^i^pn --inwir- latte^ * s * * "• 
traditions ol out' legal system that a party should be 
every reasonable opportunity to ho i • it^endancr * * i 
Bairas v. Johu: n . ^ _ . ^ ^ ^ a *J&S I^L 
affordec1 ^asonable opportunity o oe in attendance at the 
hearing ^ >••' * * <*>•<**** *~- -ub^ect 
>aiia> .*erusj ar> 
additional five-weex •-•;•- even * hough plaintif 
previously errant ~d rjuui uuntxn 
i i labi Il :ii i.1 ..: ...... was an ab~^ «_
 v,i discreijun 
where there wa:* 'u; evidence of malingering and where the nature of 
the action made tK~ "01 n intif f's personal t *• 
< - n f i i iding. There v idence 11 
malingering herei, -id County was freely given a continuance, 
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the basis of which is unknown. Claimant's personal testimony was 
essential to a finding in this instance as well. There was no 
basis for the denial of the continuance. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also stated, "The request for 
continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court 
and unless there is plain abuse its ruling will not be disturbed. 
Where there is some reasonable basis for the request it should not 
be denied merely because it may work some inconvenience to the 
other party." State v. Ma this, 319 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah 1957). The 
basis of the request in this instance—so that claimant's attorney 
could be in attendance pro hac vice or obtain local counsel—was 
certainly reasonable. 
The claimant, Isidro Garcia had filed a pro se response within 
the time periods allowed by statute, and had asserted a claim to 
the funds. The record also reflects that the Court considered a 
Motion to Continue, which was denied without adequate findings. 
Since the state already had possession of the funds, there was no 
risk that the monies would disappear or otherwise be made 
unavailable at a future date. The state could therefore not have 
been prejudiced by a continuance. The claimant was entitled to a 
full and fair hearing on the merits, of which he was deprived. He 
was not given the constitutional right to be heard. The trial 
Court thereby abused its discretion in refusing to allow a 
continuance. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, and in Appellants Initial 
Brief this Court should reverse the decision of the trial court, or 
should remand the matter for additional proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this £? day -f November, 1995. 
AMA.NIN .-.._.. . . -, -
...V 
B^^~^<^4 
Paul G. Amann 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE CT TFRVTCE 
Paul ' * -* *:. iersj*jnpd ^torne^ for appall-
personally maij LWU U .;* onp;tr* toregoing 
Appellant's Reply Briei * ^ i ^ ~F 4-fte utah *+-+--—~v General . 
postage iuii prepaid, 
DATED this J^__ day of November, 1995, 
Paul G. Amann 
Counsel for App* 
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APPENDIX 
Transcript of Proceedings before Trial Court 
1 A. I asked the passenger if he had any identification, 
2 which he did. I gave this to Trooper Porter. Porter needed on< 
3 of them — names or anything, match anything to the vehicle or 
4 anything with the vehicle. And I distinctly remember asking th< 
5 passenger who the car belonged to. He stated he did not know. 
6 Also the driver didn't know who owned the car. 
7 Q. What did you then do? 
8 A. While talking to the passenger, the odor of alcholi< 
9 beverage was present on him. I could smell that. I asked the 
10 passenger where he was coming from. He said the driver had 
11 driven up from California and picked him up in Fort Morgan 
12 because he was out of work and needed a ride home. In talking 
13 to the driver, he stated he had been to Chicago, was on his way 
14 home and picked up Istophal (phonetic) hitchhiking. 
15 Q. What did you then do? 
16 I A. Run a check through dispatch on both subjects. I 
17 believe I ran it through Grand County. Our dispatch for some 
18 reason was down, 1038, computer was down. It showed that 
19 Istophal (phonetic) had a III showing previous controlled 
20 subtance charges. 
21 THE COURT: Who is Istophal (phonetic)? 
22 THE WITNESS: He was the passenger. 
23 Q. (By Mr. Benge) After finding out that, what did yoi 
24 do? 
25 A. I approached Isidro on the fact that he didn't know 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SFPVTfF nn\r\Ta T orrwrstc <-<n^ 
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owner, operator , or a g e n t in charge of the con-
trolled premises consents in wr i t ing . 1987 
58-37-11. District cour t ju r i sd ic t ion to enjoin vi-
ola t ions — J u r y tr ial . 
11> The district courts of this state shall have juris-
diction in proceedings in accordance with the rules of 
those courts to enjoin violations of this act. 
(2) If an alleged violation of an injunction or re-
straining order issued under this section occurs, the 
accused may demand a jury trial in accordance with 
the rules of the district courts. 1971 
58-37-12. Enforcement — Coord ina t ion and co-
opera t ion of federal a n d s ta te agencies 
— P o w e r s . 
The department and all law enforcement agencies 
charged with enforcing this act shall cooperate with 
federal and other state agencies in discharging their 
responsibilities concerning traffic in controlled sub-
stances and in suppressing the abuse of controlled 
substances. To this end, they are authorized to: 
(1) Arrange for the exchange of information 
between governmental officials concerning the 
use and abuse of dangerous substances. 
(2) Coordinate and cooperate in training pro-
grams in controlled substance law enforcement 
at the local and state levels. 
(3) Cooperate with the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Utah Bu-
reau of Investigation by establishing a central-
ized unit which will receive, catalog, file, and col-
lect statistics, including records of drug-depen-
dent persons and other controlled substance law 
offenders within the state, and make the infor-
mation available for federal, state, and local law 
enforcement purposes. 
(4) Conduct programs of eradication aimed at 
destroying the wild or illicit growth of plant spe-
cies from which controlled substances may be ex-
tracted. 1971 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Sei-
zure — Procedure. 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no 
property right exists in them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been 
manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or ac-
quired in violation of this chapter; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment 
of any kind used, or intended for use, in manufac-
turing, compounding, processing, delivering, im-
porting, or exporting any controlled substance in 
violation of this chapter; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a 
container for property described in Subsections 
(l)(a) and (1Kb); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other 
paraphernalia, not including capsules used with 
health food supplements and herbs, used or in-
tended for use to administer controlled sub-
stances in violation of this chapter; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehi-
cles, or vessels used or intended for use, to trans-
port, or in any manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or conceal-
ment of property described in Subsections (l)(a) 
and (1Kb), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a 
common carrier in the transaction of busi-
ness as a common carrier may not be for-
feited under this section unless it appears 
that the owner or other person in charge of 
the conveyance was a consenting party or 
privy to violation of this chapter; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited un-
der this section by reason of any act or omis-
sion committed or omitted without the 
owner's knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject 
to a bona Fide security interest is subject to 
the interest of a secured party who could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable dil-
igence that a violation would or did take 
place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including 
formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data used or in-
tended for use in violation of this chapter; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended 
to be furnished in exchange for a controlled sub-
stance in violation of this chapter, all proceeds 
traceable to any violation of this chapter, and all 
moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities 
used or intended to be used to facilitate any vio-
lation of this chapter; but: 
(i) an interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act; and 
(ii) there is a rebuttable presumption that 
all money, coins, and currency found in prox-
imity to forfeitable controlled substances, 
drug manufacturing or distributing para-
phernalia, or to forfeitable records of the im-
portation, manufacture, or distribution of 
controlled substances are forfeitable under 
this section; the burden of proof is upon 
claimants of the property to rebut this pre-
sumption; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as de-
fined in Section 58-37b-l, Imitation Controlled 
Substances Act; 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facil-
ities, or interest in real property of any kind 
used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivat-
ing, warehousing, storing, protecting, or manu-
facturing any controlled substances in violation 
of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehous-
ing, or storage facility or interest in real 
property is subject to the bona fide security 
interest of a party who could not have known 
in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a 
violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be for-
feited under this subsection if the holder of 
the interest did not know of the act which 
made the property subject to forfeiture, or 
did not willingly consent to the act; and 
(iii) unless the premises are used in pro-
ducing, cultivating, or manufacturing con-
trolled substances, a housing, warehousing, 
or storage facility or interest in real property 
may not be forfeited under this section un-
less cumulative sales of controlled sub-
stances on the property within a two-month 
period total or exceed $1,000, or the street 
value of any controlled substances found on 
the premises at any given time totals or ex-
ceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experienced 
in controlled substances law enforcement 
may testify to establish the street value of 
the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection; and 
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(j) any firearm, weapon, or ammunition car-
ried or used during or in relation to a violation of 
the Utah Controlled Substances Act, the Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act, or the Utah Controlled 
Substances Precursor Act or any firearm, 
weapon, or ammunition kept or located within 
the proximity of controlled substances or other 
property subject to forfeiture under any of those 
acts. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this chap-
ter may be seized by any peace officer of this state 
upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction 
over the property. However, seizure without process 
may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or 
search under a search warrant or an inspection 
under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the 
subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in 
a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding un-
der this chapter; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property is directly or indirectly 
dangerous to health or safety; or 
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to be-
lieve that the property has been used or intended 
to be used in violation of this chapter. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), 
proceedings under Subsection (4) shall be instituted 
promptly. 
(4) Property taken or detained under this section is 
not repleviable but is in custody of the law enforce-
ment agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having 
jurisdiction. When property is seized under this chap-
ter, the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated 
by it or the warrant under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it 
to an appropriate location for disposition in ac-
cordance with law. 
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are pos-
sessed, transferred, distributed, or offered for distri-
bution in violation of this act are contraband and 
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. 
Similarly, all substances listed in Schedule I which 
are seized or come into the possession of the state are 
contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the 
state if the owners are unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled sub-
stances in Schedules I and II are derived which have 
been planted or cultivated in violation of this chapter, 
or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or 
are wild growths, may be seized and summarily for-
feited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its 
authorized agent, of any person in occupancy or in 
control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an ap-
propriate license or proof that he is the holder of a 
license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of 
the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this chap-
ter by a finding of the court that no person is entitled 
to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the 
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all 
property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint 
seeking forfeiture, a request that the seizing 
agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding 
that the seizing agency is able to use the forfeited 
property in the enforcement of controlled sub-
stances laws, the court having jurisdiction over 
the case shall award the property to the seizing 
agency. The seizing agency shall pay to the pros-
ecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing 
and pursuing the forfeiture action. Property for-
feited under this section may not be applied by 
the court to costs or fines assessed against any 
defendant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no appli. 
cation, any state agency, bureau, county, or mu. 
nicipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfei-
ture shall be given the property for use in en-
forcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney or, if 
within a prosecution district, the district attor-
ney for legal costs for filing and pursuing the 
forfeiture and upon application for the property 
to the director of the Division of Finance. The 
application shall clearly set forth the need for the 
property and the use to which the property will 
be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance 
shall review all applications for property submit-
ted under Subsection (8Kb) and, if the seizing 
agency makes no application, make a determina-
tion based on necessity and advisability as to 
final disposition and shall notify the designated 
applicant or seizing agency, where no application 
is made, who may obtain the property upon pay-
ment of all costs to the appropriate department 
The Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse 
the prosecuting agency or agencies for costs of 
filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to 
exceed the amount of the net proceeds received 
for the sale of the property. Any proceeds remain-
ing after payment shall be returned to the seiz-
ing agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an applica-
tion under Subsection (8)(a) or (b), the director of 
the Division of Finance shall dispose of the prop-
erty by public bidding or as considered appropri-
ate, by destruction. Proof of destruction shall be 
upon oath of two officers or employees of the de-
partment having charge of the property, and ver-
ified by the director of the department or his des-
ignated agent. 
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a 
determination for forfeiture to the state shall be 
made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation 
shall be prepared by the county attorney, or if 
within a prosecution district, the district attor-
ney where the property was seized or is to be 
seized. The complaint shall be filed in the circuit 
or district court if the property is not real prop-
erty and the value is less than $10,000. The com-
plaint shall be filed in the district court if the 
value of property other than real property is 
$10,000 or more or the property is real property. 
If the complaint includes property under the ju-
risdiction of the circuit court and also property 
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the district 
court, the complaint shall be filed in the district 
court. The complaint shall describe with reason-
able particularity: 
(i) the property which is the subject mat-
ter of the proceeding; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; 
and 
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'in) the allegations which constitute a ba-
sis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the 
court shall forthwith issue a warrant for seizure 
of the property which is the subject matter of the 
action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, 
unless the property has previously been seized 
without a warrant under Subsection 58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfei-
ture shall be filed with the county clerk, and 
served together with a copy of the complaint, 
upon all persons known to the county attorney or 
district attorney to have a claim in the property 
by one of the following methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and 
address is known, at the last-known address 
of the claimant, or upon each owner whose 
right, title, or interest is of record in the Di-
vision of Motor Vehicles, by mailing a copy 
of the notice and complaint by certified mail 
to the address given upon the records of the 
division, which service is considered com-
plete even though the mail is refused or can-
not be forwarded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose ad-
dresses are unknown, but who are believed 
to have an interest in the property, by one 
publication in a newspaper of general circu-
lation in the county where the seizure was 
made. 
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claim-
ant or interested party shall file with the court a 
verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this chapter, 
any interested person or claimant of the prop-
erty, prior to being served with a complaint un-
der this section, may file a petition in the court 
having jurisdiction for release of his interest in 
the property. The petition shall specify the claim-
ant's interest in the property and his right to 
have it released. A copy shall be served upon the 
county attorney or, if within a prosecution dis-
trict, the district attorney in the county of the 
seizure, who shall answer the petition within 20 
days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of 
forfeiture. 
(f) After 20 days following service of a com-
plaint or petition for release, the court shall ex-
amine the record and if no answer is on file, the 
court shall allow the complainant or petitioner 
an opportunity to present evidence in support of 
his claim and order forfeiture or release of the 
property as the court determines. If the county 
attorney or district attorney has not filed an an-
swer to a petition for release and the court deter-
mines from the evidence that the petitioner is not 
entitled to recovery of the property, it shall enter 
an order directing the county attorney or district 
attorney to answer the petition within ten days. 
If no answer is filed within that period, the court 
shall order the release of the property to the peti-
tioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition 
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court 
shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days. 
At this hearing all interested parties may 
present evidence of their rights of release of the 
property following the state's evidence for forfei-
ture. The court shall determine by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the issues in the case and 
order forfeiture or release of the property as it 
determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent 
of any other proceedings, whether civil or crimi-
nal, under this chapter or the laws of this state. 
<U When the court determines that claimants 
have no right in the property in whole or in part, 
it shall declare the property to be forfeited and 
direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Divi-
sion of Finance. The division shall dispose of the 
property under Subsection (8). 
(j) When the court determines that property, 
in whole or in part, is not subject to forfeiture, it 
shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the prop-
erty is subject to forfeiture and release in part, it 
shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial 
forfeiture and release, the court shall order it 
sold and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legiti-
mate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the ac-
tion, including seizure, storage of the prop-
erty, legal costs of filing and pursuing the 
forfeiture, and costs of sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for 
the General Fund, 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where 
forfeiture is declared, in whole or in part, the 
court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture pro-
ceeding, including seizure and storage of the 
property, against the individual or individuals 
whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and 
may assess costs against any other claimant or 
claimants to the property as appropriate. 1993 
58-37-14. Resort for illegal use or possession of 
controlled substances deemed com-
mon nuisance — District court power 
to suppress and enjoin. 
(1) Any store, shop, warehouse, dwelling house, 
building, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place to 
which users or possessors of any controlled sub-
stances, listed in schedules I through V, resort or 
where use or possession of any substances violates 
this act, or which is used for illegal keeping, storing, 
or selling any substances listed as controlled sub-
stances in schedules I through V shall be deemed a 
common nuisance. No person shall open, keep, or 
maintain any such place. 
(2) The district court has the power to make any 
order necessary or reasonable to suppress any nui-
sance and to enjoin any person or persons from doing 
any act calculated to cause, or permit the continua-
tion of a nuisance. 1971 
58-37-15. Burden of proof in proceedings on vi-
olations — Enforcement officers ex-
empt from liability. 
(1) It is not necessary for the state to negate any 
exemption or exception set forth in this act in any 
complaint, information, indictment or other pleading 
or trial, hearing, or other proceeding under this act, 
and the burden of proof of any exemption or exception 
is upon the person claiming its benefit. 
(2) In absence of proof that a person is the duly 
authorized holder of an appropriate license, registra-
tion, order form, or prescription issued under this act, 
he shall be presumed not to be the holder of a license, 
registration, order form, or prescription, and the bur-
den of proof is upon him to rebut the presumption. 
